The TSA: A Case Against Bureaucracy

“Demanding accountability is important, but expecting 100-percent bulletproof security is simply setting up a system for failure.  Security is a series of trade-offs with plenty of room for public debate…When we achieve a national consensus on our security strategy, we then have a chance to sustain the effort with steady support.” – Permanent Emergency

Before September 11, 2001 (9/11), the worst airline fatality event in the United States was the Pan Am 103, the Lockerbie Bombing, with 270 fatalities.  As a result, new security protocols were implemented for most international flights.  At the time, airport security was managed by airlines and the airline authority, with minimal oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Decentralized by location, most travelers simply walked through metal detectors and were occasionally subjected to handheld wands, while X-ray machines scanned a mere 5 percent of baggage. 

Then came the 9/11 terror attack, an event that would change world aviation forever.  In the United States, the newly formed TSA would oversee a government takeover of airport security for the first time.  The new agency initially depended heavily on new technology for scanning people and baggage, as it attempted to play catch-up to address past and present threats.  Protocols called for complying with standards of practice with little human interaction with the flying public.  

On an average day in the United States, nearly 500 airports servicing 45,000 daily flights must screen 3 million travelers. 

In Kip Hawley and Nathan Means 2013 book, “Permanent Emergency”, the authors outline the building of the TSA system following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.  Implementing a new federal mandate, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was charged with federal oversight of airport security using strict federal standards, advanced screening, reinforced cockpit doors, and an expanded air marshal program.  By the end of 2002, all airports were following TSA procedures.

In 2003, the newly formed department was moved to the Department of Homeland Security when domestic security functions were consolidated.  With 60,000 employees, including 50,000 screeners, air travelers were then required to present a boarding pass and ID, remove their shoes and computers, separate liquids under the 3-1-1 standard, and advance through either a metal detector or a full-body scanner.  A further analysis of risk management led to a prioritization of risks, for example, allowing blades of up to 4 inches to shift focus towards more significant threats. 

By 2025, several improvements were made for airport travelers.  Trump ended collective bargaining for TSA employees to create a merit-based system with improved efficiencies.  The liquids ban requirements and shoe removal ended as new machines with enhanced scanning were delivered to airports.  In some airfields, guest passes allow non-flying customers beyond security gates, although a national Real ID is now required, or additional screening, along with a fee, may be included.    

While US security relies heavily on technology, many look to the Israeli Model for increased safety.  Using behavioral screening along with technology, Israeli screeners incorporated the use of non-verbal cues to observe behavior, followed by one-on-one interviews when necessary.  In 2007, the US incorporated a new program called Screening Passengers by Observation (SPOT), which prioritized human observation of 94 microexpressions for stress, fear, and deception.  Using scorecards, Behavioral Detection Officers determined if more surveillance or enhanced screening was needed. 

To fund the system, user fees are charged to all airplane travelers, with two-thirds of the proceeds going to the TSA budget, while the other third is used to pay down federal budget deficits.  Since the two-thirds amassed by the user fee is not enough to cover TSA expenses, Congress must appropriate additional resources from the general funds as needed.  In exchange for this significant increase in costs from the private option pre-911, TSA Red Team testing also shows failure rates of 95 percent of banned objects getting through, while suspicious and no-fly lists are being used against political enemies, most recently Tulsi Gabbard, and January 6 participants. 

All this begs the question of whether the new bureaucracy is better than private services.  The federal government’s top-down, centralized, inflexible bureaucracy is often immune to consequences, as there are no profit motives, no incentives, and no economic calculation.  Public losses are manifest in shortages, inefficiencies, rationing, and long wait times.  Under a market-based system, managed and paid for by the airlines, success would be measured based on profits and losses, using economic calculation.  To stay in business, private security must deliver to keep their customer base happy or lose their contracts.  In fact, in 20 domestic airports across the United States, TSA duties are currently managed by private companies, although they must follow TSA protocol. 

During the recent partial government shutdown, one-third of TSA workers, despite an essential services designation requiring government workers to remain on the job, refused to show up to work, causing long lines for air travelers.  A reminder of another intrusion in industry called noninterventionist intervention, where the government creates a monopoly, prohibiting alternative options, demands taxes and fees to cover the service, and then simply fails to provide it.